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Gang Injunctions Under Heat From Equal




Gang injunctions are quasi-civil/criminal remedies meant to enjoin
alleged gang members from engaging in activities in furtherance of gang
objectives. They have been issued primarily in California in the last two
decades.1 On the surface, gang injunctions might seem like a good idea for
protecting the welfare of the community from the boisterous activities of
2
alleged gang members. But a closer look yields an Equal Protection
problem: The injunctions prohibit defendants from doing what others can
do 3 solely based on their arbitrarily conferred gang affiliation status. The
situation is more troubling when many of the people labeled as "gang
bangers" are poor minorities.
A. Proposal
Gang injunctions should be used sparingly, if at all, because they can
easily entail unconstitutional discrimination that can affect entire
communities. Gang injunction defendants should be able to claim selective
enforcement when they suspect the government attempts to restrict them in
a way in which others would not be restrained. While selective prosecution
is the type of selective enforcement claim most often invoked in the
* J.D. Candidate, U.C. Hastings College of the Law, 2008. A special thanks to the Orange
County Alternate Public Defender's office for their guidance and mentoring; to Professor Bloch
for her close continuing review; to my mom for her encouragement and support; and to the entire
staff of the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly for their amazing hard work.
1. Kim Strosnider, Anti-Gang Ordinances After City of Chicago v. Morales: The
Intersection of Race, Vagueness Doctrine, and Equal Protection in the Criminal Law, 39 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 101, 138 (2002).
2. See People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 614 (Cal. 1997).
3. See Strosnider, supra note 1, at 140.
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criminal context,4 this procedural defense is difficult to mold into a form
that befits gang injunction cases. This note proposes an alternative method
for defendants to prove selective enforcement in gang injunction cases by
pointing to instances in which non-gang members have engaged in the
defendants' same conduct, but were not prosecuted with gang injunctions.
This note also calls for the adoption of constitutional procedural
safeguards, which usually protect criminal defendants, but are strikingly
absent in gang injunction cases.
1. Gang Injunctions Entail Unconstitutional Discrimination
Gang injunctions should be rarely issued because of their potential for
discrimination. Defendants who risk criminal punishment have not
committed illegal acts but have merely been accused of gang association. 5
Prejudice can creep into law enforcement's identification process of gang
members.6 The negative impact of these injunctions can also leave marks
on society as a whole. Defendants and minority communities need a way
of combating gang injunctions when their harm overshadows their benefits.
2. Selective Prosecution Cannot Apply as a Defense Because Gang
Injunctions are Quasi-Civil in Nature
Although a procedural defense is necessary to shield minorities from
overbroad gang injunctions, the selective prosecution defense is impossible
to apply to gang injunction cases. Under the law governing selective
prosecution, as long as prosecutors have probable cause to pursue charges,
defendants cannot prevail on claims of selective prosecution.7 Prosecutors
do not need probable cause in gang injunction cases. 8 Because the remedy
is quasi-civil, gang injunction defendants cannot claim a vital element of
selective prosecution-that prosecutors lacked probable cause. 9
3. Defendants Should Be Able to Claim Selective Enforcement and Be Pro-
tected by Procedural Safeguards That Usually Apply in Criminal Cases
Rather than claim selective prosecution, defendants should be able to
show selective enforcement by arguing that non-gang members have
engaged in the same conduct in which they themselves engaged, but were
4. See id. at 122-23.
5. See Acuna, 929 P.2d at 623 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
6. See id.
7. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996).
8. See Matthew Mickle Werdegar, Note, Enjoining the Constitution: The Use of Public
Nuisance Abatement Injunctions Against Urban Street Gangs, 51 STAN. L. REV. 409, 434 (1999).
9. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464.
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not prosecuted with gang injunctions. While this method could still allow
for nuisance enjoinment, it would reduce the detriment to the defendants
being labeled as "gang members" by rendering the "gang" part of the
injunction meaningless. Defendants would be enjoined if they create
genuine nuisances, not because they appear to be part of a gang.
In addition, while constitutional guarantees that would apply in
criminal cases1° do not attach to quasi-civil gang injunctions,11 they should
attach to protect defendants in these cases.
Part II of this note delineates the contours of the quasi-civil/criminal
remedy known as the gang injunction. Part III argues that these remedies
infringe on the Equal Protection values enshrined in the U.S. Constitution.
Part IV proposes a new breed of selective enforcement claims to replace
selective prosecution in this quasi-criminal setting.
II. Background on Gang Injunctions
A. Definition of a Street Gang
There is no generally accepted definition of the gang phenomenon."
The California "gang statute" dictates that mere membership in or
association with a gang is criminal. 13 However, a gang is not a criminal
street gang under California Penal Code section 186.22 until each element
within that section has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt; the statute
punishes a person who "actively participates in" or "willfully promotes"
the criminal conduct of a gang, or who has committed certain enumerated
offenses."' 14 While some street gangs can be violent and engage in criminal
activities, the propaganda surrounding them has generated dangers for the
innocent. By riding a bike without a taillight or even walking down the
street, anyone can be approached by law enforcement and asked if they
know anyone in X gang. If he answers in the affirmative, he could be
named a defendant in a lawsuit that, if he loses, could mean he would never
be able to communicate with his friends or wear blue jeans in his
neighborhood without risking arrest."
10. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
11. See Gary Stewart, Black Codes and Broken Windows: The Legacy of Racial Hegemony
in Anti-Gang Civil Injunctions, 107 YALE L.J. 2249, 2267 (1998).
12. See Jeffrey J. Mayer, Individual Moral Responsibility and the Criminalization of Youth
Gangs, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 943, 951 (1993).
13. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(a) (West 2006).
14. See id. at § 186.22.
15. See Acuna, 929 P.2d at 623 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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That people associate with each other in gangs does not mean they
commit crimes together. Ethnic street gangs are not the same as criminal
street gangs, for example. However, even if the elements of California
Penal section 186.22 are not proven, state governments can use quasi-
civil/criminal injunctions to restrain alleged "gang bangers" from perfectly
legal activities.
B. A Unique Breed of Remedy
California, in which various counties have pursued gang injunctions,
has already enacted a penal code section making criminal certain gang
activities. 16 Gang injunctions act as a net to catch potential defendants who
do not fit within those statutes.
Anti-gang injunctions are borne out of a web of provisions from
California Civil, Penal, and Civil Procedure Codes.17 The prosecuting
agency typically alleges in the complaint that the gang and its members
have occupied and used a certain target area in a manner that constitutes a
public nuisance under Civil Code sections 3479 and 3480.18 Section 3479
defines a nuisance as:
Anything which is injurious to health, including, but not limited to,
the illegal sale of controlled substances, or is indecent or offensive to
the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to
interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or
unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary
manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin,
or any public park, square, street, or highway ....
A public nuisance is, accordingly, one that "affects at the same time an
entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons,
although the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon individuals
may be unequal., 20 A complaint for injunctive relief may also refer to the
California Penal Code's standard for a public nuisance.21 Section 370
requires that the activity to be enjoined "interfere with the comfortable
16. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22.
17. Edson McClellan, Note, People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna: Pulling in the Nets on Criminal
Street Gangs, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 343, 350 (1998).
18. Id. at 350-51.
19. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3479 (West 2006).
20. Id. at § 3480.
21. McClellan, supra note 17, at 351.
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enjoyment of life or property by an entire community or neighborhood, or
by any considerable number of persons."22
Once the prosecution makes a successful showing that the gang's
activity constitutes a public nuisance, Civil Code section 3494 authorizes
"any public body or officer" to abate the nuisance.23 Civil Code section
3491 defines the statutory remedies for a public nuisance in California as
indictment or information, civil action, or abatement.24 Based on this
section, courts impose the injunction.25 If a defendant violates the
injunction, the prosecution can file criminal misdemeanor charges under
Penal Code section 372.26 Penal Code section 372 states that any person
who maintains or commits any public nuisance is guilty of a
27misdemeanor. Each violation is a separate offense, and may provide
strong evidence that he is creating a public nuisance.28 Rather than bring a
misdemeanor charge under section 372, the prosecution will more than
likely prosecute the defendant for contempt of court.29 Hence, criminal
consequences are a great possibility for any named defendant on the losing
side of a gang injunction case.
C. Courts Have Been More Receptive to Challenges to the
Constitutionality of Discriminatory Statutes Than to the
Constitutionality of Discriminatory Injunctions
1. Acuna Upholds the Constitutionality of a Gang Injunction
In Lompoc County, the Supreme Court of California in People ex rel.
Gallo v. Acuna found constitutional two provisions of a preliminary
injunction.3 °  One provision forbade thirty-eight defendants from
"'standing, sitting, walking, driving, gathering or appearing anywhere in
public view with any other defendant or with any other known... member'
of the gang."'3' Another forbade members from challenging, threatening,
22. CAL. PENAL CODE § 370 (West 2006).
23. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3494 (West 2006); McClellan, supra note 17, at 353.
24. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3491 (West 2006).
25. McClellan, supra note 17, at 353.
26. Id.
27. CAL. PENAL CODE § 372 (West 2006).
28. McClellan, supra note 17, at 353.
29. Id.
30. Acuna, 929 P.2d at 614.
31. Strosnider, supra note 1, at 140 (quoting Acuna, 929 P.2d at 608).
Winter 20081 GANG INJUNCTIONS UNDER HEAT
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
assaulting, or battering any patrons, residents, or visitors to the city of
Rocksprings known to have complained about the alleged gangs.3
The California Supreme Court decided that the defendants' right to
association in a gang was not entitled to protection under the United States
Constitution's First Amendment because the gang was not formed for the
purpose of engaging in protected speech or religious activities.33 The
California Supreme Court concluded the provisions did not violate a gang
member's First Amendment right to associate and were not so overbroad as
to violate the defendant's Fifth Amendment right to Due Process with
respect to notice.34 In its view, the conduct enjoined met the statutory
definition of a public nuisance.35
The defendants argued that under NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.
they couldn't be bound unless it was proven that each of them possessed
intent to further an unlawful end embraced by the group.36 But the Court
distinguished NAACP by finding that gangs maintain an "urban war
zone." 37 The Court found controlling precedent in Milk Wagon Drivers
Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., in which an
injunction was issued against a union because of its violence. 38 The Acuna
Court stated that under Milk Wagon, organizations and members can be
enjoined without having a specific intent to further an unlawful aim.39 It is
possible that these are old cases and the Supreme Court has become
somewhat more enlightened since the 1950s.
Some of the gang activities enjoined in this case-such as snorting
cocaine laid out in neat lines on the hoods of residents' cars and using
residents' garages as urinals 40 -formed a reasonable basis for assuming
that the gang was a nuisance. However, there was no need to enjoin
"'standing, sitting, walking, driving, gathering or appearing anywhere in
public view with any other defendant or with any other known... member'
of the gang."' When the government seeks to enjoin less boisterous
32. Id.
33. See id.
34. Bergen Herd, Note, Injunctions as a Tool to Fight Gang-Related Problems in California
After People Ex Rel Gallo v. Acuna: A Suitable Solution?, 28 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 629,
650-51 (1998).
35. Id. at 652.
36. Acuna, 929 P.2d at 616 (citing NAACP v. Claibome Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 920
(1982)).
37. Id. at 617; see also McClellan, supra note 17, at 370-7 1.
38. Acuna, 929 P.2d at 617.
39. Id. at617-18.
40. See Acuna, 929 P.2d at 601.
41. See Strosnider, supra note 1, at 140 (quoting Acuna, 929 P.2d at 608).
[Vol. 35:2
defendants, courts should be restrained from jumping to issue injunctions
on but social settings where large numbers of minorities gather, not "urban
war zone[s]."
2. Morales Invalidated an Unconstitutionally Vague Anti-Gang Ordinance
Two years after Acuna, the United States Supreme Court, in City of
Chicago v. Morales, struck down a loitering ordinance prohibiting gang
affiliation.42 An ordinance differs from an injunction in that it is easier to
challenge because an injunction (a civil remedy) is seen as less restrictive.43
Morales limited the scope of state power and protected minorities
from the vague overreaching power of an anti-gang ordinance. 4 The Court
found that the challenged ordinance failed to comply with the Constitution
by not meeting the fair notice requirement because it was too vague and
provided too much police discretion.45 The ordinance allowed police to
arrest any group of two or more people who remained in a public place
"'with no apparent purpose' if the police 'reasonably believe[d]' the group
included a gang member and if the loiterers failed to disperse. ' '46 Because
the ordinance invested police officers with absolute discretion to determine
which activities constituted loitering, the ordinance failed to meet
constitutional standards for definiteness and clarity.47
Morales demonstrates that the Supreme Court takes discriminatory
law enforcement seriously.48 The case also illustrates that the second prong
of the vagueness doctrine, dealing with arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement, has come to serve as a de facto Equal Protection guarantee
when public statutes implicate race. 49 The doctrine checks police and law-
making bodies on legislation that primarily affects minorities. 50  The
invocation of Equal Protection in cases involving gang ordinance statutes
strongly suggests that the Clause can also apply in gang injunction actions.
42. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1999).
43. Strosnider, supra note 1, at 120.
44. See Morales, 527 U.S. at 64.
45. Id. at 50-51.
46. Strosnider, supra note 1, at 102.
47. See Morales, 527 U.S. at 63-64.
48. Strosnider, supra note 1, at 120.
49. See id. at 113.
50. Id.
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D. The Process of Selecting Gang Injunction Defendants Introduces a
Problem
The Morales Court held that the loitering ordinance was
unconstitutionally vague because it gave police discretion in deciding who
violated the statute.51 Although gang injunctions list the specific conduct
and persons to be enjoined, they also provide law enforcement with
discretion to pick the defendants before the case is filed. To be
documented as a gang member, an individual need only be seen in a target
area and either (1) admit gang membership, or (2) be identified as gang
member.52 A person is "identified" if she meets two or more of the of the
following prerequisites: (a) wore clothing or tattoos indicating gang
affiliation or used gang hand signs; (b) was named by gang members as a
gang member; (c) actively participated in gang crime; (d) was identified by
a reliable informant as a gang member; or (e) was observed associating
with gang members two or more times. 53
Criterion (c) makes gang injunctions unnecessary because if a gang
member commits a crime he will be prosecuted for it. If he goes to jail he
need not be enjoined. But all of the other criteria for identifying gang
members allow law enforcement significant leeway to determine which
gang members are to be enjoined from activities that would be legal if
performed by others. The process for selecting gang injunction defendants
brushes too closely with Equal Protection.
III. Gang Injunctions Under Heat From Equal Protection
"Race... is bound up in gang crime in a way that it is not necessarily
implicated by other crimes ... It is consistently asserted that "many
more minorities than whites are members of street gangs. 55 As a result,
gang injunctions tend to target masses of a single ethnic minority. The
effect is that many members of a minority community will not be able to
perform the same activities that people of other ethnicities in that
community will, such as "'standing, sitting, walking, driving, gathering or
appearing anywhere in public view with any other defendant or with any
other known... member' of the gang., 56 Prejudice can creep into the
51. Morales, 527 U.S. at 50-5 1.
52. See Acuna, 929 P.2d at 623 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
53. See Acuna, 929 P.2d at 623 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
54. Strosnider, supra note 1, at 125.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 140 (quoting Acuna, 929 P.2d at 608).
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identification of gang members by law enforcement 57 and defendants who
have not committed illegal act but who have been merely accused of gang
association can be at risk for criminal punishment.5 8 The discriminatory
effects of gang injunctions can also negatively impact entire segments of
the community. When rights are violated in a discriminatory way, Equal
Protection becomes an issue.
59
Defendants should be able to make claims of selective enforcement in
response to gang injunction actions, but those claims must be carefully
tailored to suit the gang injunction context. While selective prosecution is
the ordinary selective enforcement claim made in criminal proceedings,
defendants cannot claim that prosecutors lacked probable cause because
prosecutors do not need probable cause in gang injunction cases.6 °
Selective prosecution claims should be replaced by another form of
selective enforcement that can act as a procedural defense in such
proceedings. In addition, constitutional safeguards should also be provided
for gang injunction defendants because they are still battling within the
realm of criminal law.61
A. The Equal Protection Problem With Gang Injunctions
Gang injunction actions present an Equal Protection problem. The
Equal Protection Clause prohibits states from participating in
discriminatory acts. It mandates that "[n]o state shall ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."62 Gang
injunction defendants need not commit illegal activities to receive penal
punishment, but need only be reputed as gang members.63 As a result, they
are treated differently from other potential criminal defendants and are
deprived Equal Protection. All that is required for designation as a "gang
banger" is identification by law enforcement as such; 64 unfortunately, the
process of identification can be influenced by prejudice. This results in
restrictions on the freedom of minorities who may have been arbitrarily
identified as "gang bangers."
57. See Acuna, 929 P.2d at 623-24 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
58. See id. at 632.
59. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886).
60. See Werdegar, supra note 8, at 434.
61. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
62. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
63. See Acuna, 929 P.2d at 623-24 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
64. See id. at 624.
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1. Gang Injunction Defendants Are Punished for Legal Activities
Proponents of the gang injunction argue that, although defendants
need not be convicted of anything in order to have a quasi-civil/criminal
injunction imposed on them, the remedy is fair. Before a gang injunction is
issued, a court weighs the public's interests against the alleged gang
members' constitutional rights to decide whether to enjoin the defendants.65
A court must make detailed findings of facts with respect to individuals
involved, and the injunction will apply in a specific geographic area in
which the defendants reside.66 The "court supervises the restrictions that
apply, and can lift the injunction if circumstances warrant., 67
But this argument fails to consider that--even though courts must find
that the alleged conduct is worth enjoining-the actions to be enjoined by
gang injunction provisions, such as those in Acuna,68 might not give rise to
a nuisance if they were committed by non-gang members. "Civil liability
may not be imposed merely because an individual belonged to a group,
some members of which committed acts of violence., 69 Gang injunctions
discriminate on the basis of the gang member label, which is easy to
arbitrarily confer on minorities. In that respect, they are unfair because
they do not truly distinguish between those who have, and have not,
violated the law.
Race is not supposed to be a factor in the determination of whether a
nuisance exists. California Civil Code section 3479 defines a nuisance as
follows:
Anything which is injurious to health, including, but not limited to,
the illegal sale of controlled substances, or is indecent or offensive to
the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to
interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or
unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary
manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin,
or any public park, square, street, or highway ....
65. Strosnider, supra note 1, at 140-41.
66. Id. at 142.
67. Id.
68. Strosnider, supra note 1, at 139-40.
69. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 920 (1982) (individuals could not be
enjoined merely because they belonged to a group, some members of which committed acts of
violence; "For liability to be imposed by reason of association alone, it is necessary to establish
that the group itself possessed unlawful goals and that the individual held a specific intent to
further those illegal aims.).
70. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3479 (West 2006).
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In Acuna, one of the injunction's provisions prohibited thirty-eight
defendants from "standing, sitting, walking, driving, gathering or appearing
anywhere in public view with any other defendant or with any other
known... member' of the gang.",71 Gang injunctions may also prohibit
wearing "gang colors. 72 Such conduct cannot reasonably be construed as,
"injurious to health... indecent or offensive to the senses, or an
obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the
comfortable enjoyment of life or property ... ." under California Civil
Code section 3479.73
Wearing certain colors74 is not a nuisance because the law of nuisance
does not concern aesthetic preferences. 75 The test of liability for nuisance
with regard to personal discomfort is the alleged annoyance on "persons of
ordinary sensibilities., 76 Even a horse farm that emanates noises, smells,
insects, etc. onto a plaintiffs land would not pass the test of liability for a
nuisance, 77 even though-unlike the threats and public interaction sought to
be restrained in Acuna 78-- conditions resulting in the concentration of
particular noises, smells, and insects in one area can cause discomfort by
endangering people's physical health.
The term "public nuisance" may also include an act or omission that
interferes with the health, comfort, and convenience of a community.79
While it can be argued that the public interaction of alleged gang
members8" interferes with public comfort and convenience, it is merely an
obstruction of view (people might rather not see them), and aesthetic
preferences do not give rise to nuisances. 81 Public interaction with alleged
gang members differs from a low-hanging object over a sidewalk, which
constitutes a true nuisance that may pose a danger. 82 Although it can also
be argued that alleged gang members pose a danger, this argument fails to
consider that whomever is deemed to be a gang member depends on law
71. Strosnider, supra note 1, at 140 (quoting Acuna, 929 P.2d at 608).
72. See Acuna, 929 P.2d at 632 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
73. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3479 (West 2006).
74. See Acuna, 929 P.2d at 622 (Chin J., concurring and dissenting).
75. Carter v. Johnson, 26 Cal. Rptr. 279, 281 (Ct. App. 1962).
76. Id. at 280.
77. Id. at 280-81.
78. Strosnider, supra note 1, at 140.
79. See Venuto v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 99 Cal. Rtr. 350, 355 (Ct. App. 1971).
80. See Strosnider, supra note 1, at 140.
81. Carter, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 281.
82. Montgomery v. Nelson, 295 P. 1034, 1035 (Cal. 1931).
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enforcement discretion and biases, rather than the likelihood of their
causing harm.
In addition, a nuisance can be based on any act that tends to corrupt
public morals or disturb the public welfare.83 Nuisances based on
interference with public morals or welfare include billiard rooms,84 houses
of prostitution, 85 and gaming establishments that host disorderly conduct.
86
Unlike these examples, the actions prohibited in Acuna (such as public
interaction) 87 are what ordinary people might do on a daily basis, rather
than "immoral" activities that may lead to disruption of the peace because
of the atmosphere they create.
Because of their alleged gang affiliation, gang injunction defendants
are being punished for engaging in activities in which others are allowed to
participate. For such an injunction to issue, no defendant need be found
guilty of any dangerous or illegal act. All that is required for an accused to
be designated as a gang member is identification by an informant as such,
or to be seen associating with gang members on two or more occasions.88
In this way, the injunction results in unconstitutional discrimination based
on arbitrary criteria, and should be challenged on Equal Protection grounds.
2. Racial Prejudice Can Influence the Identification of Gang Members by
Law Enforcement
It is common for defendants in gang injunction cases to be members
of an ethnic minority.89 Equal Protection becomes an issue in gang
injunction cases because the remedy can be too easily applied in a
discriminatory manner. The basis of the decision of whom to prosecute is
gang affiliation, and the decision of who to accuse of being a gang affiliate
often depends on the subjective, biased assessment of a police officer based
on the impermissible factor of the person's ethnicity.
In Acuna, to determine gang "membership," the court relied on the
police department's manner of documenting gang members. 90 There, to be
a documented gang member, an individual need only be seen in a target
area and either (1) admit gang membership, or (2) be identified as a gang
83. Weis v. Super. Ct., 159 P. 464, 465 (Cal. Ct. App. 1916).
84. See Exparte Murphy, 97 P. 199 (Cal. App. Ct. 1908).
85. See Farmer v. Behmer, 100 P. 901 (Cal. Ct. App. 1909).
86. See People v. Lim, 118 P.2d 4872 (Cal. 1941).
87. See Strosnider, supra note 1, at 140.
88. Acuna, 929 P.2d at 623 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
89. See Strosnider, supra note 1, at 125.
90. See Acuna, 929 P.2d at 622 (Chin, J., concurring and dissenting).
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member. 91 A person is "identified" if she met two or more of the of
following prerequisites: (a) wore clothing or tattoos indicating gang
affiliation or used gang hand signs; (b) was named by members as a
member; (c) actively participated in gang crime; (d) was identified by a
reliable informant as a gang member; or (e) was observed associating with
gang members two or more times.9 2
In applying the above prerequisites, it is important to remember that,
in reality, law enforcement officials' suspicions of gang affiliation may
arise based on suspicious appearance 93 and it is possible to assume that
people of the same ethnicity who live in the same neighborhood would tend
to know each other. Prerequisite (a) suggests that gang colors might
signify gang membership, and may lead law enforcement to investigate
people of select ethnicities based on something as insignificant as the color
of their clothes and nothing else. Prerequisite (e) may cause police to
choose to field interview people who have spoken to gang members and
who have the appearance of being gang members, such as in their
ethnicities. Though criteria (b) and (d) depend on hearsay from alleged
gang members, they allow law enforcement enough discretion to find
alleged gang members by asking general questions about specific persons
who look like they might be gang members. For instance, law enforcement
might ask Latino man X whether Latino man Y is his friend and improperly
find Y to be a gang member if X is a documented gang member and
answers in the affirmative.94
It is possible to argue that the ethnicity of defendants in gang
injunction cases should not matter because they are at fault for associating
with certain people and for engaging in particular activities in the first
place. But when questioned by law enforcement, innocent answers such as
"I hang out with X Rodriguez" or "I like it to kick it on the weekends" may
form the basis for police suspicions of gang association or activity. 95 The
discretion given to police in choosing whom to field interview and label a
gang member gives rise to Equal Protection problems in the selection of
gang injunction defendants.9 6
Even if the police have the time to field interview so many people that
the number of interviewees of one ethnicity is not disproportionately larger
91. Id. at 623 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
92. Id.
93. See Rebecca Allen, People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna: (Ab)using California's Nuisance Law
to Control Gangs, 25 W. ST. U. L. REv. 257, 296 (1998).
94. Acuna, 929 P.2d at 623 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
95. See id.
96. Strosnider, supra note 1, at 120.
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than that of another ethnic group of interviewees, it may be easier for the
prosecution to argue and easier for a court to believe that people sharing the
same ethnicity would associate with one another and form a gang. But
research reveals that criminal behavior does not form spontaneously at the
convergence of friendship and ethnicity.97 It is unnecessary and plainly
discriminatory to choose to document people of certain select ethnicities as
gang members; however, gang injunctions make it inevitable.
3. The Discriminatory Effects of Gang Injunctions Can Hurt Entire
Communities.
In addition to the arbitrary process of selecting gang injunction
defendants, the effect of gang injunctions on minority communities
provides another reason to refrain from using these remedies in light of the
possibility that they are racially discriminatory and violate the principles
embodied in the Equal Protection Clause. Not only do anti-gang
injunctions hurt the poor minority youths they target, but they also harm
society in general. They place youths in a Catch-22 situation: They
encourage youth crime, stigmatize minority communities, neglect to solve,
but simply move, crime problems, and open the door to fear-based decision
making potentially based on insufficient evidence.
a. Anti-Gang Initiatives Place Youths in a Catch-22 Situation
Many youths join gangs out of fear of street violence and to gain
protection from it. 98 Acuna places members in a Catch-22 situation by
requiring them to choose between their fear of gangs versus their fear of the
judicial system. 99  In some neighborhoods, self-preservation motivates
youths to join gangs.100 Threats from families, local recruiters, rivals, and
others move them to seek protection. Members who join should not be
punished because of affiliation alone.' 0' Courts should level responsibility
as it is deserved, and mete out punishment to those who have actually been
found guilty of committing illegal acts.
10 2
A policy toward individual responsibility has the benefit of directing
attention away from the gang as a whole, lessening the publicity. 03
97. Mayer, supra note 12, at 959.
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Otherwise, a focus on gangs sends the message that gangs should be
feared.10 4 This only encourages membership.
10 5
b. Anti-Gang Injunctions May Encourage Youth Crime
Gangs have been characterized as hierarchical.10 6 Levels of standing
within gangs may include (1) leaders, who participate in the most violent
activities; (2) peripheral members, who are tied to the gang but do not
actively participate in its social life; and (3) recruits, whose roles are
initially undefined.'0 7 Outside the gang, there may be "wannabes," who are
not a part of a gang but may nonetheless assert membership. 0 8 If gangs
have dominating influences on disadvantaged communities, and there is a
large nonviolent gang member and wannabe population, then anti-gang
injunctions are almost certain to trap youths not involved in crime. Casting
such a wide net could actually increase their reasons for and ability to
engage in more active gang membership.'0 9 Youths may feel as though
they need not heed the rules of a system that has discarded them."10
c. Anti-Gang Injunctions Endanger Disadvantaged Communities
Anti-gang injunctions stigmatize minority communities and contribute
to white hegemony.1 ' Because minority youths tend to romanticize gang
culture, anti-gang injunctions stamp minority communities with "badges of
inferiority," which may "impinge upon a community's qualify of life and
thus symbolize its impending decay." 2
If civil injunctions are to provide hope of abating violent gang
activity, they must target people who show specific intent to further illegal
activities.' 13 Otherwise, spreading punishment among the vulnerable will
exacerbate the gang problem. There is no benefit to a neighborhood when
so many of its youths are at high risk of being banished to jail.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Stewart, supra note 11, at 2275.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2276.
110. Id. at 2279.
111. Stewart, supra note 11, at 2278.
112. Id. at2251.
113. See id. at 2278.
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d. Anti-Gang Injunctions Have a Banishment Effect by
Moving Crime to Other Areas
Proponents of gang injunctions argue that these civil remedies provide
an intermediate step between releasing defendants and incarcerating them
by severely restricting their freedom while they are in a particular
neighborhood so that they are, in effect, banished from the rest of
society. 1 4  Supposedly, this "may provide some of the incapacitative
benefits of prison without some of the malignant side effects.""' 5  The
counterargument is that this solution simply moves alleged gang members
to another neighborhood, which solves nothing and may only be a crude
form of social engineering." 6 The law should not incorporate methods of
dealing with youth crime that simply move the undesirables.
e. Fear-Based Decision Making Results in Punishment Based on
Insufficient Evidence
The Acuna Court's sweeping injunction was an overreaction to the
fear of gang crime.' 17 Even when public anxiety rises over issues like gang
violence, courts have an obligation to resist temptations to acquiesce to
public hysteria. 1 8 The court's judgment must stand on clear proof rather
than imputation of criminal responsibility." 19 Everyone's rights are at stake
when courts punish individuals based on insufficient evidence. 2° Gang
injunction defendants need a defense to shield them from fear-based
decision making.
B. Selective Prosecution Cannot Apply to Gang Injunctions Because the
Government Does Not Need Probable Cause to Pursue Injunctions
The few cases in which Equal Protection claims have been litigated in
a criminal context have involved claims of selective prosecution, 21 which
is a type of selective enforcement. In Washington v. Davis, "the Court held
that establishing an equal protection violation requires proof of
114. Andrew D. Leipold, Targeted Loitering Laws, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 474, 487-88
(2001).
115. Id. at 488.
116. Id. at 495-96.
117. Allen, supra note 93, at 304-05.
118. Id. at 305.
119. Allen, supra note 93, at 305.
120. Id.
121. Strosnider, supra note 1, at 123.
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discriminatory purpose and not just racially disparate impact from a policy
or law."'
122
United States v. Armstrong elaborated on the procedural defense of
selective prosecution, which was defined as "an independent assertion that
the prosecutor has brought the charge for reasons forbidden by the
Constitution."'' 23 "[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe
that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision
whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand
jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion."' 24 To even obtain discovery
on a claim of selective prosecution based on race or ethnicity, the defendant
must produce evidence that similarly situated offenders of another race or
ethnicity could have been prosecuted but were not.125 Even if this high
standard were met in a gang injunction case, defendants may never prevail
on a claim of selective prosecution because prosecutors in such actions do
not need probable cause to prosecute. 26  While selective enforcement
should apply to gang injunctions, selective prosecution should be rejected
in this context and another type of procedural defense, with criminal
procedural safeguards, should be adopted.
C. Proposal For a New Standard Under Which Gang Injunction
Defendants May Challenge Selective Prosecution
1. Constitutional Guarantees Usually Afforded in Criminal Cases Do Not
Attach to Gang Injunctions
Constitutional safeguards that usually accompany criminal defendants
do not exist in gang injunction cases, though criminal consequences may
result. Because the right to the appointment of counsel is not invoked
when an injunction is sought, 127 an indigent and uneducated defendant may
not stand a chance of defeating an injunction. 28 Neither does the full
panoply of criminal procedural rights (such as the rights to a jury trial, to be
122. 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (standards applicable to equal employment opportunity cases
should not have been applied in determining whether a personnel test violated due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment; a law is not unconstitutional solely because it has a racially
disproportionate impact regardless of whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose).
123. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463 (1996).
124. Id. at 464 (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978)).
125. Id. at 465.
126. See Werdegar, supra note 8, at 434.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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confronted, and to subpoena witnesses) apply to aid gang injunction
defendants. 1
29
The lack of procedural safeguards in an injunction suit is abated by the
fact that injunctions are enforced through criminal contempt proceedings,
in which the defendant may access constitutional protections.1 30  But
defendants may not be willing to risk arrest and imprisonment for only the
chance to challenge an injunction at a jury trial with appointed counsel. 131
Because gang injunction defendants face penal consequences while being
deprived of the constitutional procedural guarantees on which other
criminal defendants may rely, defendants should be provided with the
safeguards normally applicable to criminal proceedings. 
132
2. A New Basis for a Selective Enforcement Claim: Applying the Standards
for Finding a Nuisance in Civil Cases to Gang Injunction Cases
Gang injunction defendants are prosecuted for engaging in activities
for which others would not be prosecuted, solely because of their alleged
gang status. Gang injunction defendants are treated unfairly not only in
comparison to non-gang member defendants, but also in comparison to
everyone who has not been prosecuted for "standing, sitting, walking,
driving, gathering or appearing anywhere in public view" with their
friends.
133
An alternative would be to allow gang injunction defendants to prove
selective enforcement by showing they are being prosecuted for conduct
that would not be a public nuisance if committed by non-gang members. A
similar framework was suggested by Justice Mosk in his dissent in
Acuna.134 To show the conduct would not normally be considered a
nuisance, they should be able to point to evidence that non-gang members
have engaged in such activities but were not prosecuted. This framework is
fair because it takes into account that gang injunction defendants are treated
differently from non-gang members based solely on their alleged gang
reputation.
In effect, this framework would mean the death of the gang injunction.
Based on the susceptibility of such defendants and the ease with which
elements of discrimination may creep into these cases, gang injunctions
tread upon Equal Protection values and should be held unconstitutional. A
129. See id.; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
130. Werdegar, supra note 8, at 434.
131. Id.
132. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
133. See Strosnider, supra note 1, at 140 (quoting Acuna, P.2d at 608).
134. See Acuna, 929 P.2d at 632 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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counterargument is that, without such injunctions, there is no effective
means to combat the street gang problem. However, anti-gang initiatives
may not address the problem of gang crime in an effective manner. Rather,
alternatives to gang injunctions can provide more effective means of crime
control without blatantly discriminatory effects.
IV. Alternatives to Gang Injunctions
The legacy of a gang injunction has implications not only for its
defendants, but for poor young minorities and society in general.
Alternative ways to deal with youth crime are necessary. While groups of
youths may commit violent and destructive acts, targeting them as gangs is
not the way to stop them. It is uncertain just how effective gang
injunctions can be.
The ACLU reported that a Los Angeles injunction failed to achieve its
stated objective, which was an immediate reduction in violent crime and
drug trafficking and an increase in community safety. 135 Supporters of the
injunction criticize the study, claiming its analysis of violent crime and
felony drug arrest rates fails to capture the reduction in otherwise legal
behavior, such as harassment of residents, loitering, and vandalism.
136
While the Los Angeles injunction may not have decreased gang violence,
the Acuna injunction has been praised for doing SO. 13 7  In light of
conflicting evidence, the utility of gang injunctions in deterring gang-
related crime has not been fully proven.
While it is undetermined whether or not gang injunctions actually
combat crime, they may have a damaging effect on lower-class minority
youths and society by enjoining legal behavior. Because of the problems
they raise, other means of reducing gang-related crime may be warranted.
One way is to shift the focus from gangs to youths, since gangs tend to be
youth oriented. With regard to gang members who have been convicted of
crimes, a method of deterring illegal behavior would be to place on them
more probation or parole restrictions.
A. Directing Society's Attention from Gangs to Youths
Instead of addressing the problem with gang-based focus, law
enforcement could instead focus on youths. Punishment with an emphasis
on gangs may cause youths to view themselves as gang members and
therefore exacerbate the problem by alienating the young from law
135. Werdegar, supra note 8, at 440.
136. Id.at441.
137. Herd, supra note 34, at 677.
Winter 20081 GANG INJUNCTIONS UNDER HEAT
enforcement. 138 Because the use of harsher punishment for youngsters is
defective, shifting attention from the punishment of young people to the
improvement of their environments may prove a more effective method of
reducing criminal behavior.
The justice system's drift away from its rehabilitative goals and
toward punishment is not the right solution. 39  An example of the
increasing emphasis on punishment can be shown by the three methods
used to transfer certain juvenile offenders from juvenile court to adult
criminal court. 40 These three methods-judicial waiver, statutory waiver,
and prosecutorial waiver 14'-are not without their problems.
Judicial waiver gives the juvenile court judge discretion to remove the
youth from the juvenile court's jurisdiction. The absence of objective
criteria as guidelines for making such transfers gives judges unfettered
discretion, which can lead to arbitrary decisions. 142 Another way to transfer
juveniles to adult court is through statutory waiver, which occurs when the
legislature provides by statute that certain offenses are excluded from
juvenile court jurisdiction. 143 However, these statutes are often broadly
worded and thus ineffectively target the intended population of violent
juvenile offenders. 144 Statutory waiver criteria-such as age, the nature
and severity of offense, and the offender's previous history-do not allow
for an individualized assessment of amenability to treatment, and thus
obstruct the goals of the juvenile justice system. 145 The third method of
transferring juveniles to adult court is the prosecutorial waiver, in which
the juvenile court and the adult court have concurrent jurisdiction and the
prosecutor decides in which court to charge the juvenile. 146 This method
has been criticized for giving unchecked discretion to prosecutors and for
its abandonment of the original rehabilitative goals of the juvenile justice
system. 1
47
A more effective alternative may be youth programs that can help
youth view themselves as people instead of criminals or despised and
138. See Stewart, supra note 11, at 2276, 2279.
139. See Amy M. Thorson, Note, From Parens Patriae to Crime Control: A Comparison of
the History and Effectiveness of the Juvenile Justice Systems in the United States and Canada, 16
ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 845, 852-53 (1999).
140. Id. at 848, 853.
141. Id. at 853.
142. Id. at 853-54.
143. Id. at 854.
144. Id.
145. See Thorson, supra note 139, at 854.
146. Id. at 855.
147. Id.
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marginalized members of society. The ultimate goal in gang abatement
should be to improve the socioeconomic conditions of inner-city
communities.148 Otherwise, gangs may serve as proxies for extracurricular
social organizations that are absent in disadvantaged communities.
149
B. Increased Probation or Parole Restrictions for Convicted Gang
Members
Proponents of gang injunctions might argue that lenient treatment will
not work because some gang members who commit crimes cannot be
rehabilitated. A counterargument is that even if perpetrators of crime are
harder to rehabilitate, their criminal behavior can be restricted without gang
injunctions. One method of doing so would be increasing probation or
parole restrictions for gang members convicted of crime. 150 This would
allow judges to impose conditions of probation or parole that limit public
association and other activities without violating the Constitution. 15'
Unlike gang injunctions, these restrictions target only those with proven
criminal tendencies and are imposed only after the accused has been tried
with procedural safeguards. 
52
While discriminatory enforcement may still exist under this method,
153
the problem may not be as widespread as in the case of gang injunctions.
Because alternatives exist, gang injunctions are an unnecessary law
enforcement tool.
V. Conclusion
Gang injunctions violate the Equal Protection rights of affected
defendants. Use of a new framework for the selective enforcement claim
could be a way to defeat them. While selective prosecution has been a
common selective enforcement claim to make in criminal proceedings, it is
useless to gang injunction defendants because prosecutors do not need
probable cause in these cases. 154 Rather, defendants should be able to show
selective enforcement when they are prosecuted for acts that would not
constitute a nuisance if committed by non-gang members. In addition,
constitutional safeguards should also be provided for gang injunction
148. Stewart, supra note 11, at 2278.
149. Id. at 2278-79.
150. Werdegar, supra note 8, at 443.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 443-44.
153. Id. at 444.
154. Werdegar, supra note 8, at 443.
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defendants because they are still battling within the realm of criminal
law. 155
The need for a new framework is based on what makes gang
injunctions a unique breed of remedy. Defendants in gang injunction cases
have not committed illegal acts or acts that constitute a nuisance, but have
merely been accused of gang association.1 56 The ease of designating
people as gang members opens the door to discriminatory enforcement.157
Gang injunctions also impose harm on poor minority youths and society at
large. The basis for the imposition of such a "remedy" is disproportionate
to the effects of the gang injunction, the enforcement of which would
amount to a deprivation of the defendants' Equal Protection rights.
Directing attention away from punishing youths as gangs and toward
improving the environments of disadvantaged youngsters is one
alternative. 58 Another way to deter gang-related crime is to increase
probation or parole restrictions for gang members who have actually been
convicted of crimes. 159 The abolition of the gang injunction is necessary to
protect vulnerable youths and their communities from egregious societal
discrimination.
155. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
156. See Acuna, 929 P.2d at 623 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
157. See id.
158. See Stewart, supra note 11, at 2278.
159. Werdegar, supra note 8, at 443.
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